The Normativity of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2017, paperback 2021).
Reviews:
- Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, review by Tim Henning (Print Version)[Link].
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, review by Vuko Andrić (Print Version).
- Ethics, review by Clayton Littlejohn [Link].
- Journal of Moral Philosophy, review of Zachariah Wrublewski (Print Version).
- Mind, review by Conor McHugh (Print Version).
- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, review by Alex Worsnip (Webpage).
- The Philosophical Review, review by John Brunero [Link].
- Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur, review by Eva Schmidt (Webpage).
Discussions:
1. "Epistemic Normativity Without Epistemic Teleology", Philosophical Issues 34(1): 349–70, 2024. [PDF]
2. "Practical Reason" (with R. Jay Wallace), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/, 2024.
[PDF]
3. "Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number", Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13, 190–214, 2023. [PDF]
4. "Structural Rationality" (with Alex Worsnip), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-structural/, 2023. [PDF]
5. “Are Epistemic Reasons Normative?”, Noûs 56 (3): 670–695, 2022. [PDF]
6. “Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17, 27–53, 2022. [PDF]
7. “Klimaaktivismus als ziviler
Ungehorsam” [“Climate Activism as Civil
Disobedience”], Zeitschrift für praktische Philosophie 9 (1):
77–114, 2022. [PDF]
8. “Practical Conflicts As a Problem for Epistemic
Reductionism about Reasons” (with Jan Gertken), Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 105 (3): 677–86, 2022. [PDF]
9. “How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?” (with Jan Gertken), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99 (2): 271–85, 2021. [PDF]
10. “Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness”, Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4): 332-42, 2020. [PDF]
11. “Can the Lottery Paradox be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic
Permissibility?”, Episteme 16 (3): 241–61, 2019. [PDF]
12. “Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and
Transmission Principles”, Ethics 129 (1): 98–115, 2018. (PDF)
13. “What Kind of Perspectivism?”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 15(4): 415–43, 2018. [PDF]
14. “The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons” (with Jan Gertken), Philosophy Compass 12(5), e12412, 2017. [PDF]
15. “You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe that You Ought to Φ”, The Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265): 760–82, 2016. [PDF]
16. “Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle", Ethics 125 (4): 921–46, 2015. [PDF]
17. “A Dilemma for Parfit’s Conception of Normativity”, Analysis 72 (3): 466–74, 2012. [PDF]
18. “‘Ought’ and the Perspective of the Agent”, Journal of Ethics and
Social Philosophy 5 (3): 1–24, 2011. [PDF]
19. “Dürfen wir Kindern das Wahlrecht vorenthalten?” [“Are We Justified to Deny Children the Right to Vote?”], Archiv für Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie 95 (2): 252–73, 2009. [PDF]
Japanese Translation: “子どもに選挙権を与 えないことは許されるか?”, published in PRIME 33, Meiji Gakuin Daigaku, 63–81, 2011. [PDF]
Republished in an abridged and revised version: "Warum Kinder einen Anspruch auf das Wahlrecht haben", Frühe Kindheit 06/23, 40–47 (2023). [PDF]
1. “Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons", in Value, Morality, and Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, edited by Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr and Jakob Werkmäster, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University, 239–49, 2023. [PDF]
2. “Normative und motivierende Gründe: Ein Kommentar zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 72 (3): 421–8, 2018. [PDF]
3. “How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence”, in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 90–114, 2018. [PDF]
4. “Précis zu The Normativity of Rationality”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 71 (4): 560–4, 2017. [PDF]
5. “Repliken”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 71 (4): 578–83, 2017. [PDF]
6. “Willensschwäche”, in: Aristoteles-Handbuch, ed. Rapp, Christof/Corcilius, Klaus, Stuttgart: Metzler,
389–92, 2011. [Handbook article on Aristotle's conception of weakness of will; substantially revised and updated for the 2nd
ed. Berlin: Metzler/Springer, 453–57,
2021.]
7. Translation of Burnyeat, M.F. 1980: “Aristotle on Learning to be Good”. (“Lernen, ein guter Mensch zu sein. Aristoteles über moralische Bildung und Charakterentwicklung”, in: Wissen und Bildung in der antiken Philosophie, ed. Rapp, Christof/Wagner, Tim, Stuttgart: Metzler, 215–37, 2006.
8. “Wir sind nicht Eure Zukunft! Über den Status von jungen Menschen und ihren Grundrechten"” in: Auf der Suche nach neuen Wegen. Alter(n) und Gesellschaft, ed. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Berlin 17–21, 1999. ["We Are Not Your Future! On the Status of Young People and their Basic Rights.” ]
9. “Die 68er und ihre Kinder - ein Plädoyer gegen antiautoritäre und jede andere Erziehung”, in: Die 68er. Warum wir Jungen sie nicht mehr brauchen, ed. Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen, Freiburg: Kore, 139–70, 1998. ["The '68 Generation and their Children - a Plea Against Anti-authoritarian and All Other Kinds of Pedagogics."]
10. “Die Gleichberechtigung der jungen Generation”, in: Ihr habt dieses Land nur von uns geborgt, ed. Gesellschaft für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen, Hamburg: Rasch und Röhring, 309–33, 1997. ["Equal Rights for the Young Generation."]
1. Review essay of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality, by Alex Worsnip, Mind 133(532): 1229–1238, 2024. [PDF]
2. “Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (3): 481–91,
2020 (Review essay of From A Rational Point of View, by Tim Henning).
[PDF]
3. Review of The Value of Rationality, by Ralph Wedgwood, Ethics 129 (3), 501–8, 2019. [PDF]
1. "How To Be a Nonconsequentialist and Still Save the Greater Number".
2. "What We May Expect of Each Other: A Theory of Moral Obligation".
3. "Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought".